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EXTENDED ABSTRACT
Personally Identifiable Information (PII) includes any
information that can be used to distinguish or trace an
individual’s identity such as name, social security number, date
and place of birth, mother’s maiden name, or biometric records.
It also includes other information that is linked or linkable to an
individual, such as medical, educational, financial, and
employment information. PII is often the target of attacks, and
loss of PII could result in identity theft. According to the U.S.
Department of Justice, the average number of U.S. identity
fraud victims annually is 11,571,900 [1]. The total financial loss
attributed to identity theft in 2013 was $21 billion dollars,
compared to $13.2 billion total loss in 2010 [1].

definition of privacy may change as technology advances. A
dynamic approach to characterize privacy is desirable.

A. Introduction
PII is essential in protecting data security and privacy.
HIPAA defines 18 identifiers that might be used to identify an
individual as Protected Health Information (PHI) and requires
the information must be protected in any form or medium.
However, there exist additional identifiers that can be used to
link to an individual. What is PII? What does PII include? How
does publicly available information (e.g., public records, social
networks, search engines, etc.) affect privacy? These questions
are important. However, the answers to these questions are
vague.

Privacy Attributes: We use an actor to refer an entity (e.g.,
people, organization, etc.) on the Internet. An actor has certain
characteristics, such as name, address, phone number, etc.,
which are known as “attributes”. Privacy attributes are the
attributes which may affect privacy. Privacy attributes describe
what privacy is and what it includes.

Our studies show that developing an accurate model for PII
is a fundamental issue to resolve many challenges in privacy,
such as privacy measurement, data loss assessment, policy
making, etc. This paper proposes to develop an attribute-based
statistic model for privacy exposure measurement and privacy
impact assessment based on text mining and machine learning.
B. An Attribtue-based Statsitc Model for PII
The PII model includes three key components: privacy
attributes, privacy sensitivities, and attribute correlations.

Privacy Sensitivities: Each attribute has an impact on
privacy. This impact is referred to as a privacy impact factor. A
privacy impact factor is a numerical value. We consider the
privacy impact factor for full privacy disclosure as 1. An
attribute’s privacy impact factor is a ratio of its privacy impact
to the full privacy disclosure. Thus, an attribute’s privacy impact
factor has a value between 0 and 1. Privacy sensitivities describe
how an attribute affects privacy.

First, more identifiers may exist and can be used to link to an
individual. For example, Montjoye et al. found that human
mobility traces are highly unique [2]. Using a test dataset where
the location of an individual is specified hourly, 95% of the
individuals can be uniquely identified using four spatiotemporal
points. Second, since the correlations of personally identifiable
information are not clear, it is also uncertain what data should be
protected due to deep analytic techniques. Inference attacks exist
and can be used to collect more indirect information from
existing known data which may be linked to personal identity
[3]. Moreover, non-sensitive data could be aggregated to reveal
more sensitive information and cause identity theft [4], [5].
Third, advance techniques such as de-anonymization could be
used to link anonymous data to personal identity, and many
efforts have been conducted on privacy preserving to obscure PII
in datasets [6], [7]. However, de-anonymization attacks have
been found to be effective in re-identifying anonymous data [8],
[9]. Fourth, numerous public accessible information is available
via public records, social media and the Internet. Information
may not be available before and is now accessible on the
Internet. It is not clear how the publicly available information
affects user privacy. Fifth, privacy is also evolving and the
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Attribute Correlations: Attribute correlations describe how
attributes are related. There are two correlations which need to
be further explored, i.e., inference information and aggregated
information. Inference information is hidden information which
can be derived from a known attribute. For example, location of
high school indicates an individual’s hometown and hometown
may be related to personal preferences, such as sports, etc.
Attributes also show group properties. For example, as found in
[4], [5], 87% of Americans can be uniquely identified by five
digit zip code, gender, and date of birth. However, none of these
characteristics alone can significantly affect privacy.
Let 𝐴 be an actor and we assume the PII model includes 𝑚
privacy attributes. We use 𝑎𝑖 to represent the i-th privacy
attribute. Thus, 𝐴(𝑎1 , 𝑎2 , … , 𝑎𝑚 ) describes all attributes which
may affect 𝐴 ’s privacy. We use 𝑠𝑖 to represent the privacy
sensitivity of i-th attribute. Thus, we have 𝑆(𝑠1 , 𝑠2 , … , 𝑠𝑚 )
representing 𝐴 ’s privacy attribute sensitivities. Attribute
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A raw attribute can be identified as a new privacy attribute if it
is not similar with any existing privacy attributes.
Thresholds for co-occurrence and similarities can be derived
and used for machine learning to automate the process. Once a
raw attribute is confirmed to be a privacy attribute, the attribute
is added to the knowledge base for future analysis. This
approach is based on text mining and machine learning. It is
dynamic and will be very useful to track privacy trends on the
Internet.
2) Attribute Senstivity Evalaution
Sensitivity is a numerical value between 0 and 1 which
indicates an attribute’s impact on privacy. As discussed, a term
weight (tf x idf) can be derived based on text mining. A
normalized term weight between 0 and 1 will be used as an
initial sensitivity value. Using a term weight as attribute
sensitivity may have limitations. For example,
 The connection between term weight and privacy
sensitivity needs to be justified.
 Using term weight as privacy sensitivities may violate
attribute correlations.

correlations are manifested in a number of rules. Let 𝑟𝑖 be a
correlation rule and we use 𝑅 = {𝑟1 , 𝑟2 , … , 𝑟𝑛 } to represent
attribute correlations. Thus, an attribute-based PII model is
defined as including:
Attributes: 𝐴(𝑎1 , 𝑎2 , … , 𝑎𝑚 )
{ Sensitivities: 𝑆(𝑠1 , 𝑠2 , … , 𝑠𝑚 )
Coorelations: 𝑅 = {𝑟1 , 𝑟2 , … , 𝑟𝑛 }
The model defines what privacy is, how an attribute affects
privacy, and how the attributes are related. It can help resolve
many challenges in security and privacy. For example, using
attributes and sensitivities, data loss can be assessed and risk can
be analyzed. Using attribute correlations, potential sensitive data
can be identified and removed in the de-identification process.
1) Attribtue Extraction
Attribute extraction is based on text mining and machine
learning. Three data sources are used for text mining:
 Privacy documents such as privacy laws, regulations,
directives, policies, instruction letters, etc.
 Online social network and website user profiles
 Web search engines such as google, Bing, etc.

These two limitations can be further improved using the
second approach, sensitivity justification and adjustment based
on discovered constraint rules.
Attribute sensitivities are not random value and they must
obey constraint rules. We have observed that the following rules
must be satisfied when assigning sensitivities to privacy
attributes. Let 𝑎1 and 𝑎2 be two attributes and 𝑠1 and 𝑠2 be
their sensitivities,
 If 𝑎1 is privacy attribute and 𝑎2 is not, 𝑠1 > 𝑠2 ;
 If 𝑎1 is essential to a user than 𝑎2 , 𝑠1 > 𝑠2 ;
 If 𝑎1 is used more frequently than 𝑎2 in security
incidents, 𝑠1 > 𝑠2 ;
 If 𝑎1 can be inferred from 𝑎2 , 𝑠1 ≤ 𝑠2 ;

A knowledge base is established to include the initial PII
model. The initial privacy attribute set includes the 18
identifiers defined in the HIPPA document. A document filter
will be used to identify these three types of data sources. Text
mining will then be conducted on these documents. Term
frequency (tf) and inverse document frequency (idf) will be
calculated for each term in a document. A weight (tf x idf) is
assigned to each term. A raw set of attributes could be extracted
based on the weight ranking. Other term weighting methods
also exist [10].
The raw set of attributes needs to be further analyzed. We
use term association and term similarities to further justify if an
attribute is a privacy attribute or a duplicate attribute.
Association of each raw attribute and existing privacy attributes
will be checked. The association is represented using a
true/false matrix where 𝑡1 , 𝑡2 , … , 𝑡𝑚 are the known privacy
attributes, 𝑡𝑚+1 , 𝑡2 , … , 𝑡𝑚+𝑝 are raw attributes, 𝐷1 , 𝐷2 , … , 𝐷𝑛
are mining documents, and 𝑘𝑖𝑗 = 0 𝑜𝑟 1 (1 ≤ 𝑖 ≤ 𝑛, 1 ≤ 𝑗 ≤
𝑚 + 𝑝 ). 𝑘𝑖𝑗 = 1 indicates 𝑡𝑗 ∈ 𝐷𝑖 otherwise 𝑘𝑖𝑗 = 0 . We
define co-occurrence value between privacy attribute 𝑡𝑗 (1 ≤
𝑗 ≤ 𝑚) and term 𝑡𝑚+𝑙 (1 ≤ 𝑙 ≤ 𝑝) as

More rules might be discovered and used when we evaluate
attribute sensitivities. These constraint rules will also be part of
the knowledge base to guide the text mining and machine
learning. We will use these rules to justify and adjust the
sensitivity value assigned to an attribute [11].
3) Attribtue Correlation Revelation
Attributes are not independent. They may depend on each
other. We are interested in capturing two particular kinds of
correlations, inference information and aggregated information.
Attribute correlations can be described by 𝑅 = {𝑟1 , 𝑟2 , … , 𝑟𝑛 }
where 𝑟𝑖 is a correlation rule such as
𝑝𝑖
𝑉𝑖1 → 𝑉𝑖2 ,
where 𝑉𝑖1 and 𝑉𝑖1 are two subsets of the privacy attribute set
and 𝑝𝑖 ( 0 ≤ 𝑝𝑖 ≤ 1) is a probability to indicate how much
information of 𝑉𝑖2 can be learned from 𝑉𝑖1 . For example,

𝑛

𝑐𝑜𝑜(𝑡𝑗 , 𝑡𝑚+𝑙 ) = ∑ 𝑘𝑖𝑗 ∗ 𝑘𝑖,𝑚+𝑙
𝑖=1

A new attribute might be a privacy attribute if it has a high
occurrence with an existing privacy attribute.
Similarities will also be checked between the raw attributes
and the known privacy attributes where 𝑑𝑖𝑗 is the weight of term
𝑡𝑗 in the document 𝐷𝑖 . A similarity value will be calculated
between the new attribute 𝑡𝑚+𝑙 (1 ≤ 𝑙 ≤ 𝑝) and the existing
known attribute 𝑡𝑗 (1 ≤ 𝑗 ≤ 𝑚).

𝑝=1

correlation rule {𝑎𝑖 } → {𝑎𝑗 } describes an inference rule which
indicates that attribute 𝑎𝑗 can be inferred from attribute 𝑎𝑖 .

𝑛

𝑝=1

Correlation rule {𝑎𝑖 , 𝑎𝑗 , 𝑎𝑘 } → {𝑎𝑡 } describes an aggregation
rule which indicates that attribute 𝑎𝑡 can be further decided by
attributes 𝑎𝑖 , 𝑎𝑗 , and 𝑎𝑘 together. The correlation rule can be

𝑠𝑖𝑚(𝑡𝑗 , 𝑡𝑚+𝑙 ) = ∑ 𝑑𝑖𝑗 ∗ 𝑑𝑖,𝑚+𝑙
𝑖=1
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{𝑎2 } → {𝑎3 } . New correlation {𝑎1 } → {𝑎3 } can be deduced
and added to the knowledge base.
C. Privacy Impact Assessment
The PII model includes privacy attributes, attribute
sensitivities, and attribute correlations. To measure privacy
exposure, privacy measurement functions and attribute
visibilities are required. Our previous works on privacy
measurement proposed three functions for privacy
measurement: weighted privacy measurement function,
maximum privacy measurement function, and composite
private measurement function [14]. Correspondingly, three
privacy indexes are defined: weighted-privacy index,
maximum-privacy index, and composite-privacy index [14].
Using the PII model and privacy indexes, privacy exposure can
be measured and privacy impact can be assessed on the Internet.
D. Summary
An attribute based statistic model is proposed to measure
privacy exposure and assess privacy impact based on personal
identifiable information. The model includes three key
components, i.e., privacy attributes, privacy sensitivities, and
attribute correlations. The approaches used to develop the model
are based on text mining and machine learning. It is different
than the existing approaches used in natural language processing
and the approaches used in studying contextual privacy. Natural
language processing, e.g., SemEval [15], can determine the
sense of the word ‘privacy’ in a context. However, it does not
address attribute sensitivities and correlations. Contextual
privacy targets to protect privacy in a context [16] based on the
assumption that we know privacy and have clear definition of
privacy. However, such definition and model for privacy is not
available in real practice.
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